Paper: We Need Anonymous Sources

My third paper written in college; this was meant to be a comprehensive research paper. It actually ended up sucking pretty badly in terms of writing, but if you can look past the bad writing and the argumentative properties (I am arguing one side of it, after all), it serves as a decent introduction to the legal status of anonymous sources today. (Also, reading at least part of the court opinions and the decisions in the Judith Plame case are highly recommended.)

Why We Need Anonymous Sources

Journalists are considered the ultimate check on our government. They courageously uncover and report on governmental abuses and stories of great public importance. The information they provide has toppled administrations and shown the public the sorts of crimes we commit in the name of peace. One of their most important tools is the anonymous source; the whistle blower who is unwilling to speak on the record for fear of losing a job or breaking an unjust law. These sources have been instrumental in most of the journalistic coups of the last half-century, and it is clear that the entire country, through journalists, has come to depend on them. Given this state of affairs, it is certainly worrisome, indeed even frightening, to see journalists jailed or fined for keeping confidential sources confidential. Yet, while often unreported in the mainstream press, this sort of thing happens far too often. We depend on journalists to bring us critical stories and keep the government (our representative to the world) honest, and journalists depend on their anonymous sources to tell these stories. An anonymous source by its very nature is worthless once exposed, and to protect the liberties and principles our country holds dear we need journalists to continue functioning. To help in that fight, we should both expect and encourage journalists to seek out information from sources who may refuse to speak on the record. Inevitably, any argument for the use of anonymous sources depends on proving their benefit. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward's Watergate investigation relied on one such source: Deep Throat, now known to be former FBI associate director Mark Felt (Halloran), was crucial to the Watergate investigation, yet his anonymity survived thirty years and a Congressional investigation into the Watergate scandal. Without Deep Throat the true extent of the Watergate conspiracy would never have been uncovered; though Woodward & Bernstein's reporting was rampant with unidentified sources of all kinds, each of the few times their story was wrong it was their fault rather than their sources'. More recently, The New Yorker reported in May 2004 (about a week after CBS' 60 Minutes 2 broadcast some images) that an Army investigation into the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq had found mounds of evidence on ethical and legal violations (Hersh). The article provided, in stunning detail, the records of an “Article 32 hearing” (essentially a precursor to court-martial) and the evidence found by the investigation. The scandal provoked a huge outcry from both the world community and the United States; in conjunction with troubles at Guantanamo Bay, this scandal has resulted in a recently-passed Senate bill that stringently defines torture and forces the United States to adhere to the same regulations outside our borders as we do within them, regardless of whether the prisoner is a citizen of the United States. (Kiely) These important (and hitherto presumed unnecessary) measures would never have occurred without the bravery of an anonymous source. Other stories of successful and appropriate employment of anonymous sources abound. Laura Handman lists several of interest in her essay ”Protection of Confidential Sources: A Moral, Legal, and Civic Duty.” The “Pentagon Papers”, a series of secret military documents that showed how the government knew that the military had been failing in Vietnam for years, were published only because an anonymous source was willing to commit a felony. Anonymous sources were also instrumental for reporters in a number of other stories, like those on the infamous Iran-Contra deal, the FBI's Surreptitious Entry Program (“routinely” used to break into private residences), the Anita Hill sexual-harassment case that nearly kept Clarence Thomas off the Supreme Court and increased awareness of sexual harassment, and a series of Pulitzer Prize-winning stories that exposed corrupt practices in fertility clinics (Handman 375). Jonathan Alter put the case for anonymous sources well, writing in a follow-up to Newsweek's infamous Guantanamo Bay abuse story (alleging [apparently incorrectly] that guards had flushed a Quran down the toilet):

Confidential sources have been instrumental in breaking almost all of the landmark stories of the past half century, from the secret history of the Vietnam War (the Pentagon Papers) to Watergate and the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal (uncovered by the same Michael Isikoff now pilloried by the right); from the lies of the tobacco and nuclear industries (Karen Silkwood was one such source) to the truth about Enron. After 9/11, the American public first learned that Osama bin Laden was the culprit through confidential sources. Without leaks, readers and viewers would not have known that the FBI failed to connect the dots or that Al Qaeda was still recruiting within the United States or that reports of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq were false. Every day, anonymous sources help the media sort out which government agencies and businesses are telling the truth and which are not. (Alter 38.)

Given all of this, it is difficult to argue that the dangers of anonymous sources, or the missteps of reporters in utilizing them, can outweigh the good they have done our country in these and other cases. While the government does not directly discourage the use of anonymous sources through legislation, it indirectly discourages their use through criminal investigations. While reporters can almost never be jailed for printing what they have heard, their sources can be jailed for illegally disclosing information. This leads to an ability to indirectly pressure reporters by requiring them to testify about how they obtained their information; testifying in such a case would be a compromise of the reporter's professional integrity, but even though many believe the First Amendment protects a “journalistic privilege,” refusing to testify can land a reporter in jail for contempt of court, a la the Valerie Plame leak: In a complicated and very political mess, several reporters at various news organizations were made aware that Valerie Plame, wife of Joseph Wilson, worked at the CIA. Because Mrs. Plame was technically a covert operative, any individual who learned her identity utilizing security clearance, and then identified her (or, technically, revealed her name) had committed a felony. The situation was further complicated because Joseph Wilson, an outspoken critic of the Bush Administration and the intelligence which led the USA into war with Iraq, had published an inflammatory editorial attempting to discredit some key intelligence. (McCollam 31-32) Two of the reporters who learned Mrs. Plame's identity (Matthew Cooper and Judith Miller; Miller never actually wrote about the discovery) refused to testify about their source in the grand jury investigation that followed, and were ordered jailed for contempt of court. (Zelnick 541-46) [Cooper later avoided jail by testifying after he received permission from his source; Miller stayed in jail for some 80 days before receiving similar assurances and a limit in the scope of her testimony.] (Madore) In plenty of other cases, journalists are witnesses to some commonplace crime exclusively because of their profession, making the question of whether they can be forced to testify even more one of the First Amendment, as in the only Supreme Court case on reporter's privilege before Cooper and Miller's appeal. Branzburg vs. Hayes was a consolidated case of three journalists who had been subpoenaed for their knowledge of criminal acts and refused to testify. Paul Branzburg had witnessed two men preparing $5000 worth of hash in the course of writing a story on hippies; Earl Caldwell was a journalist trusted by the Black Panthers and allowed to witness their private conversations; Paul Pappas was allowed into Black Panther headquarters in New Bedford, Massachusetts in order to write a story on an expected police raid that never came. Each of them refused to testify when subpoenaed, and their appeal eventually went before the Supreme Court, which “resolved” the issue by delivering one of its most confusing decisions (Kenworthy). In its decision on Branzburg v. Hayes the court split 5-4 in favor of requiring the reporters to testify. The dissenting opinion found a protection in the First Amendment, and outlined a “balancing test” that, despite its minority viewpoint in the original case, has become working precedent in the lower courts: “the government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information (“Branzburg vs Hayes”).” Even one of the concurring judges, Justice Powell, wrote a secondary opinion in which he worried about the possibility that special prosecutors could make the media into “an investigative arm of the government;” he said both that he could see a journalistic privilege developing in the future and that the government should not use the power of subpoenas to harass journalists; indeed, his opinion all but advises journalists to request that a judge quash every subpoena they receive. And though the Supreme Court may not recognize a journalistic privilege against testimony about anonymous sources, it does recognize the right of an anonymous source to remain such. In 1982 Dan Cohen was an adviser to a Republican gubernatorial candidate in Minnesota who approached two reporters and offered to give them court records on the Democratic candidate, on the condition that Cohen himself be granted anonymity. The two reporters agreed, but the editors of their respective papers (the St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch and the Minneapolis Star & Tribune) decided to name Cohen in the resulting stories. After losing his job, Cohen sued the publishers and won many hundred thousands of dollars in damages (“Cohen vs. Cowles Media Co”). Wending its way up through the courts on appeals from both parties, the total award to Cohen was reduced (as it had initially included punitive damages, which a later court ruled were not legal) and then removed by the Minnesota State Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, and, in another 5-4 decision, ruled that Cohen could sue for the damages under breach of contract (“Cohen vs. Cowles Media Co”). While the likelihood of a court ruling that damages could be awarded to a source revealed under subpoena is small, the precedents set by this case and Branzburg seem too contradictory to each be held. Such cases are certainly enough to give pause to any reporter wishing to utilize a confidential source with important information. Given the conflicts among these many cases, it seems clear that the Supreme Court should rule on a new case clarifying the reporter's privilege and responsibility with regard to confidential sources. And there is plenty of previously uncovered ground on which to stand. For instance, pastors, therapists, and lawyers all have privilege in court; none may be required to provide incriminating testimony on their client or penitent and some are prohibited from doing so by law. All of these examples of court privilege work directly for the client, often against the good of society, because people who know the truth about a crime aren't allowed to share it. Against this we have a journalistic privilege, which would protect leakers — but in important leak cases the source has usually provided a service to our country. So journalistic privilege would be a direct benefit to society, rather than an impediment as in the case of these other privileges. Moreover, journalists are recognized as being in a legal relationship with their source (as shown by Cohen; remember, he won damages for breach of contract) and as having a responsibility towards the source, similar in many ways to that of a lawyer or a therapist: the source, like a client, provides secret information to the journalist, may expect that the information be held confidential unless permission is given to the contrary, and may sue within the legal system if that confidentiality is broken. Considering these arguments for a journalistic privilege, the conflicts between some of the Supreme Court journalistic privilege cases, and the state support of reporter's privilege — there are now 31 states that now have shield laws of their own, 18 others that have court precedents creating some level of journalistic privilege (McCollam 33), and a Justice Department policy limiting when its lawyers should subpoena reporters (Handman 586) — it seems the common law reporter's privilege has evolved to the point where it may be recognized by the Supreme Court even if it does not reside strictly in the First Amendment (though clearly a strong case may be made that it does). And in view of the arguments presented here, it seems proper to rule on the side of anonymity. But to decry the absence of such a ruling incorrectly implies not only that the Supreme Court alone can protect our rights, but also that journalists and justice must work in opposition. In sharp contrast to subpoena cases like the Valerie Plame leak or Branzburg, some investigators have obtained valuable knowledge from journalists working in the same area. Woodward & Bernstein's Watergate investigation is one such example. Readers of All the President's Men are often left with the impression that Woodward & Bernstein did more to uncover criminal conduct than the Justice Department and the grand jury combined, and that Woodward & Bernstein's reporting was responsible for uncovering evidence that Watergate was part of a larger conspiracy rather than a single incident. The Ransom Center, which now owns all of Woodward & Bernstein's Watergate notes, began opening them in February 2005, and Professor David Greenberg of Rutgers University recently spent some time with the previously private files (Greenberg 51-52). He says

Consider the notes of an interview Woodward conducted with Sam Ervin on January 22, 1973, just after the North Carolina senator had been named to head the newly created Watergate Committee. At the time, the view that Watergate did not extend into the White House upper reaches, and that the burglars acted on their own, held sway. But Woodward and Bernstein reported the existence of a wider campaign of White House illegality. The interview notes show that Ervin was eager to learn the reporters' sources, indicating his interest in investigating beyond the boundaries the FBI had placed on his inquiry. “Want list of witnesses to subpoena,” Woodward recorded Ervin saying, suggesting that he wanted to follow up on the Post's discover of a broader White House conspiracy ... Ervin had apparently concluded that the official inquiries thus far had been inadequate, but that by pursuing Woodstein's [Woodstein is a combination of Woodward and Bernstein's last names first coined by their editor Ben Bradlee] leads, he might further unravel the Watergate mystery. He did.(52)

Such events as that described here provide a strong argument that prosecutors would be better-served by being friendly towards the press than intimidating them (intentionally or not) through subpoena. Journalists perform services essential to this country, and anonymous sources help them in their task. Journalists and their anonymous sources act as a watchdog on both our government and corporations. They expose criminal conspiracies and give us windows into otherwise ignored areas of life. The relationship between journalist and source is important to each professionally and personally, and it is important to us societally. Unfortunately, pressure on journalists who make use of anonymous sources is becoming ever more common. If the Supreme Court will not provide the protection necessary, the people must do so through their representatives and pass a federal “shield law” preventing reporters from being required to testify about their sources. Sources:

• Alter, Jonathan. “A Big Source of Frustration.” Newsweek. May 30, 2005: 38.
• Bernstein, Carl, & Bob Woodward. All the President's Men. 2nd ed. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
• “Branzburg vs. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).” Findlaw. 29 June 1972. Acc 14 Nov 2005. http://laws.findlaw.com/us/408/665.html.
• “Cohen vs. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).” Findlaw. 24 June 1991. Acc 15 Nov 2005. http://laws.findlaw.com/us/501/663.htm
• Greenberg, David. “Beyond Deep Throat.” Columbia Journalism Review. 44.3 (2005): 51-53.
• Halloran, Liz. “Out of the Shadows.” U.S. News & World Report. June 13, 2005: 26.
• Handman, Laura. “Protection of Confidential Sources: A Moral, Legal, and Civic Duty.” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, & Public Policy. 19.2 (2005): 575-588.
• Hersh, Seymour M. “Torture at Abu Ghraib.” The New Yorker. May 10, 2004: 42.
• Kenworthy, Bill. “Branzburg vs. Hayes (1972).” Sheridan Con-Law. 12 July 2005. Acc 14 Nov. 2005. http://www.typepad.com/t/trackback/2810254
• Kiely, Kathy & Diamond, John. “Fight over abuse law pits Bush against party allies.” USA Today. 10 November 2005: 11A.
• Madore, James T. “Freed, Reporter Testifies.” Newsday. 1 Oct 2005: A07
• McCollam, Douglas. “Why the Plame case is so scary: Attack at the Source.” Columbia Journalism Review. 43.6 (2005): 29-37.
• Zelnick, Robert. “Journalists and Confidential Sources.” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy. 19.2 2005: 541-52.

Paper: Ethics in Investigative Reporting

This paper discusses ethics in investigative reporting through Woodward & Bernstein's All the President's Men (if you haven't read this book, you need to). It's not so good as the last one I posted, but does provide an interesting glimpse into some of the tactics of investigative journalism if you've yet to read the book or have forgotten it.

Ethical Boundaries in Investigative Reporting

Watergate. It is a name whose meaning stretches far beyond a luxury Washington hotel. It is a name of scandal, crime, and cover-up. It is a name that changed a generation. It is a name that destroyed a President. And so it may dishearten some to consider that Watergate's new meaning was revealed to us through incredibly unethical investigative reporting. Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward were arguably directly responsible for the Watergate investigations and most certainly played an instrumental role in keeping the incident in the public consciousness. Yet in their book All the President's Men they portray their own investigation as fraught with moral lapses. And while they admitted to having private doubts, they continued on because it is sometimes acceptable for investigative journalists to be morally flexible. Our country prides itself on journalistic freedom for good reason. A free press is one of the essential elements of a functioning democracy; it watchdogs over the legislature to prevent the subtle passage of dramatic bills (like the USA PATRIOT Acts), keeps an eye on the President to insure he doesn’t overreach his authority or hoodwink the public, digs into the past of judicial nominees more thoroughly than even the legislature can, and comments on court cases and opines on constitutional law. And of course the press also reports news, keeping citizens abreast of events in the world. It is possible to perform some of these duties while operating on a level moral plane, and, when possible, journalists should stay on the straight and narrow. Reporting the election of some official, the ratification of a treaty, or the past rulings of a judicial nominee are all fairly passive activities that can be reported without any difficult moral decisions. True investigative reporting is a different matter. In a case such as the Washington Post’s Watergate investigation, information must be obtained for the investigation to continue, and that information is often concealed behind unwilling subjects and legal barriers. The ends certainly do not always justify the means, but All the President's Men showcases many instances of generally acceptable rule-bending. A brief primer: On June 17th, 1972, five men were arrested at the Watergate Hotel in Washington, D.C. for attempted burglary. The Democratic National Committee’s headquarters were in the Watergate, and the burglars had been apprehended in that area of the hotel. Over the next several months, the Washington Post (along with a few other news organizations) exposed several pieces of critical information that eventually led to President Richard Nixon resigning from his post. Among those stories: the link between the Watergate burglars and the White House itself, a trail of money that financed dozens of other shady, sometimes illegal, political operations, evidence that the President’s top White House aides had been personally and directly involved in the operation, and evidence that President Nixon had been directly involved in the cover-up. The first example of moral ambiguity from All the President's Men is the acquisition of private records. Early in the book, Bernstein writes about how one of his first steps in pursuing a lead on Bernard Barker (Barker was the lead burglar of the Watergate Hotel) and his connections to the Committee to Re-elect the President (CRP) involved obtaining Barker's phone records (35-36) and bank statements (41):

Bernstein had several sources in the Bell system. He was always reluctant to use them to get information about calls because of the ethical questions involved ... It was a question he had never resolved in his mind. Why, as a reporter, was he entitled to have access to personal and financial records when such disclosure would outrage him if he were subjected to a similar inquiry by investigators?

Without dwelling on his problem, Bernstein called a telephone company source and asked for a list of Barker’s calls. (35-36) While the new information was very important in showing the depth of the conspiracy, Bernstein had misgivings that he simply glossed over; we may now judge him with the luxury of hindsight. Phone and bank records are definitely private and can be obtained by the government only with a judge's approval, but obviously no such clearance is possible in journalism. I contend that the reason such things are protected from the government has to do with size. The government is huge, and there is a genuine fear that if the government can freely examine such records investigators may begin watching us all without good reason and begin monitoring people as soon as they come into contact with suspicious persons. However, such fears are not applicable with news organizations—even if they could somehow acquire the manpower necessary to undertake such detailed examinations, sources would balk at the sudden increase in information access. It's a simple matter of size and resources causing fear of information access, and because a journalistic investigation has access to neither great size nor great resources, this access is acceptable. Tactic propriety often depends on the target. For instance, at one point Bernstein, having learned that Donald Segretti was probably involved in shady dealings of the CRP, tried to contact him (120):

... There was no law firm listed under Young and Segretti. There were several Segrettis, however. After several calls, Bernstein reached Mrs. A. H. Segretti in Culver City. She said she was Don’s mother. Bernstein bent the rules a bit. The Post had a firm policy that its reporters were never to misrepresent themselves. But he didn’t tell Mrs. Segretti he worked for the Washington Post. When he left his name and numbers, they were for both his and Woodward’s apartments.

His behavior here is clearly toeing beyond the line. Segretti (and his mother) were private citizens, and to contact civilians under false pretenses is repellent. Though investigative journalists have some privileges, this is not one of them. However, if this tactic were employed against a government agency it would be legitimate: there are no legal differences between reporters and private citizens as far as disclosing government information is concerned, but in practice there are sometimes prejudices that make deceit an unfortunate necessity. Luckily enough, this incident also revealed a moral benefit of working in teams—Woodward answered Segretti’s return call, and immediately dispelled any misinformation by properly identifying both himself and Bernstein. Bernstein then unfortunately continued his phone escapades by pretending to be Segretti, hoping to provoke a response from Gordon Liddy that would show a link between the two (121):

Bernstein went into an unoccupied office near the newsroom. He was really going to break the rules this time, and he didn’t want Bradlee or anybody else to walk by his desk and hear him doing it. ... All he wanted was some sign of recognition, something like, “What’s the problem, Don?” Unfortunately, Bernstein had not designed a scenario to deal with the possibility Mrs. Liddy would answer the phone and ask who was calling.

Entrapment is a controversial subject most often associated with drug “stings,” and the debate in that arena is bitter indeed. As shown here, it was a low thing for Bernstein to do, and I find myself glad that it ended up failing. Even so, while obtaining more evidence would perhaps have been wise before attempting such a trick, one can hardly fault journalists for employing a trick against government officials (Liddy was on the CRP at the time but had previously worked as a White House aide) that the government itself uses in domestic intelligence-gathering operations. The same arguments apply to both a government operation and investigative journalists: the actions may be undesirable, but the results work directly for the good of society. Of course, even the Woodward and Bernstein miracle duo occasionally erred in their reporting, and the results were disastrous. Consider their feelings after they published a story alleging that Hugh Sloan, the CRP's treasurer, had, during a grand jury deposition, named White House Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman as personally controlling the money used to fund the Watergate break-in. “This time they really had the White House. The attribution to Sloan's grand-jury testimony was something Ziegler [White House Press Secretary] would not be able to duck. That was not hearsay. Hugh Sloan was the guy who'd handled the money, and he had sworn an oath.” But then a fellow reporter tells Woodward that Sloan’s attorney had denied the story’s truth.

Woodward went over to Bernstein’s desk and tapped him on the shoulder. We may have a problem, he said softly ... Bernstein suddenly felt sick and thought he might throw up... Then he and Woodward walked into Sussman’s [editor] office ... All three went into Rosenfeld’s [another editor] office and turned on the television. What they were to see on the screen was something they would never forget. Sloan and his attorney, Stoner, were walking into a law office where Sloan was to give a deposition. Daniel Schorr, the veteran CBS correspondent, was waiting there with a camera crew. Schorr approached Sloan and asked him about the Post’s report of Sloan’s testimony before the grand jury. Sloan said his attorney would have a comment. Schorr moved the microphone to Stoner. “Our answer to that is an unequivocal no,” he said. “We did not—Mr. Sloan did not implicate Mr. Haldeman in that testimony at all.” Sussman, Woodward, and Bernstein looked at one another. What had gone wrong? They had been so sure.

The reporter’s feelings had been dramatically reversed in a period of minutes; they were frightened, confused, and angered. They thought they had confirmation from three separate sources on the story. One was Sloan himself, and a conversation with his attorney slightly restored their hopes that the essential story (if not the attribution) was true. But they still wanted to know where they had gone wrong, and so they moved on to question their second source, an FBI agent. Their reaction, after the agent fearfully refuses to answer their questions, is strong:

The reporters spotted one of the agent’s superiors in the hallway. Their next move represented the most difficult professional—unprofessional, really—decision either had ever made. They were going to blow a confidential source. Neither had ever done it before; both knew instinctively that they were wrong. But they justified it. They suspected they had been set up; their anger was reasonable, their self-preservation was at stake, they told each other.

Bernstein and Woodward then actually do it, talking to the unknown superior, revealing that the agent is a source and trying to determine if they’d been fed false information—despite the fact that both the agent and Sloan had been previously reliable sources. A confidential source and a journalist enter into a serious pact with each other the moment they begin exchanging information, and blowing a confidential source on suspicions as ill-founded as those here is simply inexcusable. Of particularly interesting note, then, is the outcome. Outing the source to his boss doesn’t gain the reporters anything. They weren’t being fed bad information, and they realize later that they themselves had caused the error in their story. So this completely out-of-line decision not only harmed a previously useful working relationship, it also gained them nothing. Going too far beyond the line simply doesn’t help, providing another moral safety net for investigative reporters eager for results. After that point, the reporters resorted to tricks and games far less often, but the last attempt was serious indeed: they tried to get members of the Watergate grand jury to talk about their findings (207-211). While it is actually not illegal to question jurors about a grand jury proceeding, it is illegal for the juror to disclose any information, so the reporters were attempting to get innocent people to break the law.

Everyone in the room had private doubts about such a seedy venture. ... The misgivings, however, went unstated, for the most part. The reporters’ procedure would be to identify themselves, tell the juror that they had learned from an anonymous mutual acquaintance that he or she knew something about Watergate and ask if he or she was willing to discuss the matter. They would leave unless the juror, without prodding, volunteered something. Nothing would be said about the grand jury unless the juror mentioned it. ... Only one person volunteered that he was on the grand jury, and he explained to Woodward that he had taken two oaths of secrecy in his life, the Elks’ and the grand juror’s, and that both were sacred trusts.(210)

One juror eventually reported the incident to Judge Sirica, presiding over the case; Judge Sirica called Bernstein & Woodward in and the practice was halted. Even though nothing happened, this is one ethical breach that I actually can't agree with, and serves as a reminder that nobody in this country should get absolute passes on such affairs. But it also serves to reinforce my broader point that journalists should be allowed moral lapses: many of the possible wrongs journalists may commit can be prosecuted or easily stopped by a source if the source is so inclined (in much the same way this incident was stopped), providing a net of moral security for the reporter. If a source feels the reporter has gone too far, the source can simply pull the plug, and down the reporter may fall. And it’s worth noting that Judge Sirica agreed that the reporters had some privilege: in a scene where he calls Bernstein and Woodward before the court, he upbraids them for their actions but doesn’t divulge his target to everybody else, allowing them to continue their investigation through other channels. Clearly there are times at which potential sources of information should not be tapped because of the ethical complications involved; just as clear is the fact that there are also times at which an investigative journalist must resort to ethically muddy waters in order to obtain essential information for an important story. Our examination of Bernstein & Woodward's Watergate investigation has revealed numerous cases of difficult decisions which turned up important new information, without which the investigation would probably have died. While there are other times at which their choices produced undesirable consequences, those consequences hurting other people were few — and it's worth noting that the worst decisions often produced no results. Determining the appropriate course of action can be difficult in the middle of an investigation, but that makes it all the more important that we allow our press, our safeguard of freedom and government regulator extraordinaire, to undertake steps that we might not allow ourselves or the government itself to even consider.

Paper: Bias in the Media

Shortly after I arrived at college as a freshman, I was in a "Reading the News" writing course, and decided to analyze the biases present in the Fox News and LA Times articles when President Bush took responsibility for the federal government's failures in Hurricane Katrina. This is one of my better papers.

Media Political Bias A study of foxnews.com & latimes.com

President George W. Bush recently shocked the country (or at least its liberals) when he personally accepted responsibility for the federal government's failures (in search & rescue, refugee services, and mobilization of personnel) in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and its flooding of New Orleans. It was hailed as his first admission of failure (in 5 decidedly mixed years of presidency), a politically astute move, and another brainchild of political mastermind Karl Rove. But regardless of its motivation, his statement provides an interesting case study in the realities of media bias. Both the Los Angeles Times and Fox News — in their online forms, latimes.com & foxnews.com — covered this story. The Times, as a major urban newspaper, should be fairly objective; Fox declares itself “Fair and Balanced” within its slogan. Even so, Fox is famously conservative. The LA Times, while quick to point out its Pulitzer Prizes and far more subtle, is considered definitely liberal. Each agency's coverage reveals those political slants through diction, article location, sources quoted, overall tone, and topics covered. The direction and clearness of these slants determines, almost as much as location, the agency's audience. But while Fox is known by everybody to be conservative, many readers of the LA Times consider themselves to be digesting a thoroughly objective paper. Sadly, an analysis of coverage reveals the opposite is sometimes true, and it is important that readers watch for bias in their news consumption if they wish to remain personally balanced. In a print newspaper location is the simplest indicator of bias to analyze. While the Internet makes such placement tests harder to perform, a day after the story came out, latimes.com still had the article available in a prominent position on the homepage; in order to access the story on foxnews.com I had to follow a link to the Political section and then find the right story amid a myriad of works with small link sizes. The latimes.com appears more eager for readers to learn of the story than foxnews.com was. This argues for a relative anti-administration slant in latimes.com and a pro-administration bias in foxnews.com. The most obvious part of a story is its headline. Online, the headline serves to attract readers to the story through links; in both print and online news headlines set the attitude carried throughout the rest of each article. The headline is also one of the most biased areas of a newspaper story, and an editor's political views can often be accurately guessed just by perusing the headlines. foxnews.com's story employs the headline “Bush: I'm Responsible for Some Katrina Failures;” the use of “responsib[ility]” implies proper action and maturity (even if after failure). The latimes.com headline is “Bush Accepts Blame for Slow Hurricane Response,” and “blame” has connotations of wrongdoing and non-repentance, along with its denotations of direct and exclusive fault, which are dredged up despite Bush's action of accepting the fault. These headlines continue the biases observed in “placement” of each article, though the foxnews.com headline is a semi-quote of Bush and perhaps more fair. The subheadings in each article continue the same trend as the headlines, as the latimes.com states “President acknowledges flaws at all levels of government” before prominently introducing, on a semi-related note, “Louisiana death toll reaches 423.” This makes the latimes.com seem interested in providing as many negative connotations as quickly as possible. foxnews.com again takes the opposite tack, informing readers that “President Bush will address the country Thursday” and reminding them that Michael Brown (then-current head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)) has resigned (presumably under pressure). This paints a picture of Bush as decisive and hard-working in response to the emergency, and informs the reader that some blame has already been shared out. Each paper has already revealed a fairly strong bias in the headlines and subheadings. Of especially interesting note is that while the supposedly extreme-right foxnews.com coverage is arguably less biased than that of latimes.com, at least thus far. Immediately upon looking at the article bodies, one can see a large difference in size — foxnews.com's article is roughly 500 words, as compared to the 1500 on latimes.com. This disparity is only a symptom of content, though: the two articles, despite their headlines, focus on radically different topics. While both articles start with the “news bites” from Bush's speech, they take different approaches and diverge completely within three paragraphs. The foxnews.com article contains two quotes in three paragraphs and reveals (with unintentional irony) that the quotes were made during a joint press conference with Iraq's president (whose own comments and issues are left unmentioned). The latimes.com points out that this is the first time Bush himself has accepted blame, but portrays him as trying to minimize it as much as possible (“Bush also insisted”,”said he wanted more cooperative...officials”). The latimes.com seems to be a far more politically biased paper in this area. The amazingly dissimilar coverage simply diverges farther as you move through the article. foxnews.com rather appropriately moves on to specific plans for fixing the problem, as told by FEMA's acting head R. David Paulison and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, but lingers there only briefly. What's more politically interesting and expressive of some sort of bias is the fairly quick turn towards terrorist preparation from Hurricane Katrina relief — these two topics have little to do with each other (except how resource allocation for one hurts the other) and the transition is an obvious ploy to any cynic. Both Chertoff and Bush have two quotes each in which they warn that the world has not stopped moving because of Katrina and we must continue to be prepared in other areas. The article ends on a decidedly ominous note as Chertoff is quoted “[O]ne of the things I said was we're racing the clock. Unfortunately, the hurricane beat us;" in context it has much the same emotional effect as warnings about another terrorist attack. The latimes.com, on the other hand, very rapidly moves into analysis of what went – and what is still going – wrong with Katrina. FEMA made several critical errors, “bureaucratic infighting raged,” and nursing home owners are getting charged with negligent homicides. The article's first half is decidedly negative, though in the tenth paragraph lightens up as “there [are] more heartening signs of revival.” That happy attitude lasts only three or four paragraphs before nosediving in the face of a section on emergency preparedness in case of a terrorist attack or another natural disaster. More reports on confusion follow, employing such negative words and phrases as “floundering,” “lashed out,” “chaotic,” and “hamstrung.” There are also serious reports of “bureaucratic infighting” — state officials have been unable to contract with recovery agencies because they required financial approval from FEMA, for instance. This coverage clearly has a far more negative content than that from foxnews.com; on the flip side, the latimes.com coverage also stays near Katrina for more of the article. While both foxnews.com's worries about terrorism and the latimes.com's information on failures within New Orleans are worth discussing, neither of them is directly related to a story about the President's (finally!) accepting responsibility. They were included to add greater interest and emotion to the story, but the selection of each subject matter seems to be a clear matter of bias (generally in terms of administration policy) on the part of the editor or reporter. While foxnews.com is unabashedly (if not openly) conservative, the latimes.com pretends to neutrality — but if its editors are all liberal, this may simply mean its own bias is more subtle and therefore more insidious. The last things worth noting are the bylines at the bottom of the foxnews.com page and the top of the latimes.com. “Fox News Catherine Herridge and The Associated Press contributed to this report;” “By Nicholas Riccardi, Ashley Powers and Josh Meyer, Times Staff Writers.” foxnews.com seems to have obtained much (or even most) of its article from a wire service; the Times thought that what it had to say was worth the time and expense of its own reporters. Of more direct interest is the Associated Press' presumed obligation to provide neutral reporting to its hugely varied subscribers, while the Times had to satisfy only its own morals and the demands of readers and advertisers. This means that the base of the foxnews.com article was probably neutral and the observed bias was introduced in a re-write or edit, implying deliberate bias. The latimes.com piece, on the other hand, was probably made in an attempt at neutrality, but by a team composed almost exclusively of liberals. Both foxnews.com and latimes.com have their own bias which can be determined through careful analysis of their articles. foxnews.com is unduly interested in terrorism; the latimes.com is certainly far more negative with regard to President Bush. In this article, foxnews.com seems to be targeted at those interested mostly in homeland security, while latimes.com is intended for people with an anti-Bush bias or strong interests in Hurricane Katrina policy. Yet while the foxnews.com bias is obvious, the latimes.com bias is at least as strong and all the more dangerous for its subtlety. Sources:

• Herridge, Catherine. “Bush: I'm Responsible for Some Katrina Failures.” FoxNews.com. Sept. 13th, 2005. 20th Sept. 2005
• Riccardi, Nicholas; Powers, Ashley; Meyer, Josh. “Bush Accepts Blame for Slow Hurricane Response." LATimes.com. Sept. 14th, 2005. 20 Sept. 2005